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I INTRODUCTION 
 
YouTube, the video sharing website has risen to be one of the most popular and 
profitable websites on the Internet. What was first created in February 2005 as a 
platform for people all over the world to share videos, has now developed into a 
billion dollar business, that is an integral part of the Google empire. However, while 
the success and popularity of YouTube is clear, the associated copyright issues which 
lie at the very core of the YouTube platform are far from settled. Evidencing the legal 
uncertainty surrounding the operation of YouTube, is the current high profile 
litigation which has been brought by entertainment company, Viacom International. 
The case filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York and any subsequent appeals, have the potential to be one of the most influential 
copyright decisions in the digital era. 
 
YouTube is not the only user generated intermediary to have encountered legal 
difficulties, rather it exemplifies the copyright challenges facing user generated 
intermediaries. Indeed, the evolution of Web 2.0 and other new digital technologies 
have enabled digital content to be easily reproduced and communicated online, 
without the permission of the copyright owner. The following paper will provide an 
analysis of the recent Viacom v YouTube case, including the claims brought by 
Viacom, both party’s arguments and an examination of the key issues, which are 
likely to decide the case. The paper will also consider copyright challenges for other 
user generated intermediaries, such as blogs and wikis. Finally, the paper will provide 
an analysis from an Australian perspective of some of the copyright challenges which 
user generated intermediaries are likely to encounter under Australian copyright law.  
 
 
II VIACOM v YOUTUBE  
 
A Viacom’s complaint 
On 13 March 2007, Viacom International Inc, one of the largest media corporations in 
the United States brought an action for copyright infringement in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York against YouTube Inc and its 
parent company, Google Inc.1 The complaint begins with an analysis of the 
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technological landscape. In essence, Viacom assert that the emergence of new digital 
technologies over the past decade have revolutionised the way people inform and 
entertain themselves. Viacom claims, while many people have used these 
technologies to express themselves creatively, these very same digital technologies 
have also been misused to fuel an explosion of copyright infringement. In Viacom’s 
view, YouTube is one such entity. In paragraph 2 of the complaint Viacom allege 
that: 
 
YouTube has harnessed technology to wilfully infringe copyright on a huge scale, depriving 
writers, composers and performers of the rewards they are owed for effort and innovation, 
reducing the incentive of America’s creative industries, and profiting from the illegal conduct 
of others as well. Using the leverage of the Internet, YouTube appropriates the value of 
creative content on a massive scale for YouTube’s benefit without payment of license. 
YouTube’s brazen disregard of the intellectual property laws fundamentally threatens not just 
the Plaintiffs, but the economic underpinnings of one of the most important sectors of the 
United States economy.2 
 
Viacom further allege in the complaint that the: 
 
Defendants actively engage in, promote and induce this infringement. YouTube itself publicly 
performs the infringing videos on the YouTube site and other websites. Thus, YouTube does 
not simply enable massive infringement by its users. It is YouTube that knowingly reproduces 
and publicly performs the copyrighted works uploaded to its site. YouTube deliberately built 
up a library of infringing works to draw traffic to the YouTube site, enabling it to gain a 
commanding market share, earn significant revenues, and increase its enterprise value. 
YouTube has deliberately chosen not to take reasonable precautions to deter the rampant 
infringement on its site. Because YouTube directly profits from the availability of popular 
infringing works on its site, it has decided to shift the burden entirely onto copyright owners to 
monitor the YouTube site on a daily or hourly basis to detect infringing videos and send 
notices to YouTube demanding that it “take down” the infringing works.3 
 
At the heart of the complaint, Viacom alleges six causes of action of copyright 
infringement against YouTube and Google. The first three causes of action attempt to 
hold YouTube and Google liable for primary, or direct copyright infringement. They 
are for: 
1. Public performance – the defendants have, without permission of the 
copyright owner, publicly performed and authorised the public performance of 
the infringing uploaded videos;  
2. Public display – the defendants have, without permission of the copyright 
owner, publicly displayed and authorised the public display of the infringing 
uploaded videos; and 
3. Reproduction – the defendants have, without permission of the copyright 
owner, reproduced and authorised the reproduction of the infringing uploaded 
videos through the YouTube website. 
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The final three causes of action all attempt to hold YouTube and Google liable under 
the doctrine of secondary or indirect copyright infringement. These claims include: 
4. Inducement of copyright infringement – the defendants are liable for inducing 
the infringing acts of YouTube users, who infringe the plaintiff’s copyright by 
uploading infringing videos to the YouTube website. 
5. Contributory copyright infringement – the defendants are liable for 
contributing to the infringing acts of YouTube users, who infringe the 
plaintiff’s copyright by uploading infringing videos to the YouTube website.  
6. Vicarious copyright infringement – the defendants are vicariously liable for 
the infringing acts of YouTube users, who infringe the plaintiff’s copyright by 
uploading infringing videos to the YouTube website.  
 
Countering the claims by Viacom, YouTube and Google in their defence claim that: 
 
Viacom’s complaint in this action challenges the careful balance established by Congress 
when it enacted the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). The DMCA balances the 
rights of copyright holders and the need to protect the Internet as an important new form of 
communication. By seeking to make carriers and hosting providers liable for Internet 
communications, Viacom’s complaint threatens the way hundreds of millions of people 
legitimately exchange information, news, entertainment and political and artistic expression. 
Google and YouTube respect the importance of intellectual property rights, and not only 
comply with their safe harbor obligations under the DMCA, but go well and beyond what the 
law requires.4  
 
YouTube and Google’s defence, essentially denies each of the allegations in 
Viacom’s complaint and raises 12 defences in their favour. These defences include 
the safe harbors, licence, fair use, failure to mitigate, failure to state a claim, innocent 
intent, copyright misuse, estoppel, waiver, unclean hands, laches and substantial non-
infringing uses.  
 
B The key issues likely to decide the case  
Viacom v YouTube Inc and Google Inc is likely to be decided on the basis of three key 
issues, which are in question in the case. The first issue concerns the allegations of 
primary or direct copyright infringement against YouTube and Google. In particular, 
whether the necessary element of volition is present in YouTube’s operations. In 
order to establish an action for primary or direct copyright infringement under United 
States copyright law, there must first be a volitional act committed by the defendant in 
regard to the infringement.5 Generally, the courts in the United States have held that 
the automated copying by machines, occasioned by others, is insufficient to establish 
a volitional act. Importantly, in Religious Technology Center v Netcom On-Line 
Communications Service Inc,6 the Court held that ‘[a]lthough copyright is a strict 
liability statute, there still should be some element of volition or causation which is 
lacking where a defendant’s system is merely used to create a copy by a third party.’ 
This issue of volition was more recently examined in Parker v Google Inc,7 where the 
Court held ‘[w]hen an ISP automatically and temporarily stores data without human 
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LoopNet Inc, 373 F3d 544, 549 (4th Cir 2004). 
6 907 F Supp 1361, 1368-1370 (ND Cal 1995). 
7 422 F Supp 2d 492, 497 (ED Pa, 2006). 
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intervention so that the system can operate and transmit data to its users, the necessary 
element of volition is missing.’ 
 
In the present case, the question will be whether the manner in which the uploaded 
videos are performed, displayed and created is sufficiently automated enough, so as to 
negate any active volitional involvement by YouTube in each act. This issue is likely 
to come down to a technical analysis of YouTube’s involvement in the uploaded 
videos, for example whether transcoding the uploaded videos into Flash format – so 
that they can be viewed on the YouTube website – constitutes a volitional act, or is 
simply an automated process without any active, volitional involvement. However, it 
should be noted that most of the decisions involving a ‘volitional act’ have concerned 
the caching and archiving of data by an Internet service provider. In this regard, the 
Court may well apply the same reasoning applied in Playboy Enterprises Inc v 
Frena,8 where the defendant was found liable for hosting images uploaded by others, 
despite the defendant claiming there was no active, volitional involvement.  
 
Assuming the necessary element of volition can be established, the second issue likely 
to be heavily contested is the application of the safe harbor provisions under the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US)9. These provisions limit liability for 
qualifying service providers from monetary relief for direct, vicarious and 
contributory copyright infringement.10 The relevant safe harbor in question is § 
512(c)(1)11 which provides: 
 
A service provider shall not be liable for monetary relief, or, except as provided in subsection 
(j), for injunctive or other equitable relief, for infringement of copyright by reason of the 
storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or 
operated by or for the service provider, if the service provider: 
(A)(i) does not have actual knowledge that the material or an activity using the 
material on the system or network is infringing; 
(ii) in the absence of such actual knowledge, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which infringing activity is apparent; or 
(iii) upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts expeditiously to remove, or 
disable access t, the material; 
(B) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, 
in a case in which the service provider has the right and ability to control such 
activity; and 
(C) upon notification of claimed infringement as described in paragraph (3), responds 
expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is claimed to be 
infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity. 
 
In particular, two provisions will be crucial to the case, § 512(c)(1)(A)12 the ‘red flag’ 
provision and § 512(c)(1)(B)13 the financial benefit provision. Under § 512(c)(1)(A),14 
a service provider will be disqualified from the safe harbor, if they had actual or ‘red 
flag’ knowledge of the infringing material. Under this provision, a service provider, 
such as YouTube, is not under a positive obligation to remove material, which 
infringes copyright. However, they will lose their safe harbor, where they become 
                                                 
8 839 F Supp 1552 (MD Fla 1993). 
9 17 USC § 512. 
10 Perfect 10 Inc v Cybernet Ventures Inc, 213 F Supp 2d 1146, 1174 (CD Cal 2002).  
11 17 USC. 
12 17 USC. 
13 17 USC. 
14 17 USC. 
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aware of ‘red flags’, that is facts or circumstances from which infringing activity is 
apparent and fail to act. In this regard, Viacom asserts that YouTube does have the 
requisite knowledge of copyrighted material uploaded to their website.15 They claim 
that YouTube actively monitors uploaded videos, for example, they remove obscene 
or offensive videos and create ‘channels’ and ‘featured videos’ sections.16 This aspect 
of the case is likely to require an analysis, into just how much actual or constructive 
knowledge YouTube have in regard to the infringing videos, including the technology 
which YouTube currently uses. It should also be noted, that the comments made by 
the YouTube chief executive, that YouTube will use filtering technology to identify 
and remove infringing videos for copyright owners who have entered into agreements 
with YouTube, is likely to count in Viacom’s favour.17  
 
The second provision likely to be heavily litigated, is the financial benefit provision.18 
Under this provision, a service provider will be disqualified from the safe harbor, 
where they receive a financial benefit, which is directly attributable to the infringing 
activity, where they have right and ability to control it.19 Generally, a service provider 
conducting a legitimate business will not be considered to have received a ‘financial 
benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity’. For example, receiving a one-
time set-up fee and flat periodic payments from customers, whether they be engaging 
in infringing activities or not, would not constitute a ‘financial benefit’. However, the 
situation in YouTube’s case is quite different, as their main form of revenue is 
through advertisements which feature on search pages, licensed videos and previously 
above the videos themselves, including infringing videos.      
 
This provision was recently considered in Perfect 10 Inc v CCBill,20 where the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the relevant enquiry to make 
when considering whether a service provider has received a ‘direct financial benefit’, 
is ‘whether the infringing activity constitutes a draw for subscribers, not just an added 
benefit’.21 In Viacom’s view, YouTube is an entertainment destination. ‘The public at 
large are not attracted to YouTube’s storage facility or technical functionality – 
people are attracted to the entertainment value of what’s on the site’.22 In this regard, 
Viacom claim that YouTube will lose their safe harbor, as they are receiving a direct 
financial benefit from infringing videos, where they have the right and ability to 
control it, through the sale of advertisements. This may potentially be one of 
Viacom’s strongest arguments in the case, as previously YouTube operated 
advertisements directly above the videos, including videos which infringed copyright. 
Arguably, the effect of this may be that YouTube was not receiving a one-time set-up 
fee and flat periodic payments, rather a direct financial benefit every time a user 
viewed an infringing video.23 
                                                 
15 Michael Fricklas, Our Case Against YouTube (2007) The Washington Post 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/23/AR2007032301451.html>. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, (United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007) [7], [45]. 
18 17 USC § 512(c)(1)(B). 
19 17 USC § 512(c)(1)(B). 
20 481 F 3d 751 (9th Cir). 
21 Ellison v Robertson, 357 F 3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir 2004). 
22 Fricklas, above n 15. 
23 Viacom International Inc v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and Google Inc, (United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007) [37]. 
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III COPYRIGHT ISSUES FOR OTHER USER GENERATED 
INTERMEDIARIES  
 
YouTube is not the only user generated intermediary to encounter difficulties with 
copyright law. Currently other user generated intermediaries, including MySpace, 
Veoh, Grouper and Bolt are all the subject of ongoing litigation for copyright 
infringement.24 It is should also be noted, that YouTube is also the subject of two 
other actions for copyright infringement.25 In particular, a recent class action filed 
against YouTube and Google by the English Premier League and independent music 
publisher, Bourne Co.26 The copyright issues associated with these user generated 
intermediaries also have the potential to extend to more participatory intermediaries, 
such as blogs and wikis.27 Indeed, in many cases the copyright issues involved are 
likely to be more prevalent, given the highly personalised form of content production 
which blogs and wikis provide. In this regard, it should be noted that thus far, there is 
yet to be a major reported decision involving issues of copyright infringement on a 
blog or wiki, although there have been a number of cases filed against blogs and 
bloggers, which have failed to proceed to trial.28 
 
 
IV USER GENERATED INTERMEDIARIES UNDER AUSTRALIAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 
 
While user generated intermediaries are afforded a degree of certainty and protection 
under the safe harbor provisions in the United States. The situation is less clear in 
other jurisdictions, like Australia. While the Australian Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
                                                 
24 For example see Greg Sandoval, Universal sues MySpace for copyright violations (2007) CNET 
News <http://news.com.com/Universal+sues+MySpace+for+copyright+violations/2100-1030_3-
6136829.html>; Tur v YouTube Inc, No 06-04436 (CD Cal, filed 14/7/2006); Io Group Inc v Veoh 
Networks Inc, No 06-3926 (ND Cal, filed 23/6/2006); Universal Music Group Recordings Inc et al v 
Grouper Networks Inc, No 06-6561 (CD Cal, filed 16/10/2006); Universal Music Group Recordings 
Inc et al v Bolt Inc, No 06-6577 (CD Cal, filed 16/10/2006); Universal Music Group Recordings Inc et 
al v MySpace Inc, No 06-7361 (CD Cal, filed 17/11/2006). 
25 The Football Association Premier League Limited and Bourne Co v YouTube Inc, YouTube LLC and 
Google Inc, (United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, filed 4 May 2007); 
Tur v YouTube Inc, (CD Cal, 2006), 797. 
26 For more information see <http://www.youtubeclassaction.com>. 
27 For an overview of the legal issues involving blogs see Damien O'Brien, ‘Blogs and the Law: Key 
Legal Issues for the Blogosphere’ (2007) Forthcoming June Media and Arts Law Review.    
28 For example a Maine advertising agency in May 2006 filed a copyright infringement suit against a 
local blogger who had posted a number of draft advertisements from the Maine Department of 
Economic and Community Development website, to his blog. The case was eventually withdrawn by 
the advertising agency. See  Warren Kremer Paino Advertising v Duston, Civil No 06-047 (5 May 
2006); Harry Wessel, Orlando lawyer is Web hero after defending blogger (2006) Orlando Sentinel 
<http://www.orlandosentinel.com/business/orl-blogsuit1206may12,0,2087986.story?track=rss>; Robert 
Weisman, Blogger who criticized Maine tourism office faces lawsuit (2006) The Boston Globe 
<http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/04/28/blogger_who_criticized_maine_tourism_office_
faces_lawsuit/>. Also see NXIVM Corporation and First Principles Inc v The Ross Institute, WL 
22298756 (NDNY 2003); NXIVM Corporation and First Principles Inc v The Ross Institute, F 3d 471 
(2nd Cir 2004); NXIVM Corporation and First Principles Inc v The Ross Institute, 543 US 1000 
(2004). 
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contains similar safe harbour provisions to the United States, their operation is 
significantly narrower. In addition to this, Australian courts have also interpreted the 
legislative provisions regarding authorisation liability (secondary or indirect liability) 
strictly. Further uncertainties arise in regard to the multiple levels of potential lability 
under copyright law, for user generated intermediaries.  
 
A Authorisation of copyright infringement  
Under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) a person or organisation that authorises another 
person to do an infringing act, without the licence of the owner, will themselves 
infringe copyright.29 In determining whether a person or organisation has authorised 
the doing of an act which infringes copyright, it is necessary to consider: 
(a) the extent (if any) of the person’s power to prevent the doing of the act 
concerned; 
(b) the nature of any relationship existing between the person and the person who 
did the act concerned; and 
(c) whether the person took any other reasonable steps to prevent or avoid the 
doing of the act, including whether the person complied with any relevant 
industry codes of practice.30  
 
However, in order to protect the position of intermediaries, such as carriage service 
providers (CSPs), a defence to authorisation liability was introduced under ss 39B and 
112E of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). This defence provides that a person, including 
CSPs, will not be held to have authorised copyright infringement merely because the 
facilities provided by them for making a communication, are used by someone else to 
infringe copyright.31 The effect of this defence was first considered in Universal 
Music Australia Pty Ltd v Cooper, where the Federal Court held that s 112E did not 
apply, as Cooper had done more than simply provide the facilities for the making of 
communications, by encouraging users to download infringing music files.32 
Similarly, in Universal Music Pty Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings the Federal Court 
held that the defence under s 112E did not apply to the defendants, as they had 
committed positive acts designed to encourage copyright infringement.33 
 
There remains little judicial guidance on the interpretation of ss 39B and 112E of the 
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). However, from the decided cases it would appear that 
where the person or organisation is intimately involved with the infringing content 
then this defence to authorisation will not apply. For example, in Universal Music Pty 
Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings Wilcox J held that something more is required than 
simply providing the facilities for someone else to infringe copyright to be held liable 
                                                 
29 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1), 101(1). 
30 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 101(1A); University of New South Wales v Moorhouse and 
Angus & Robertson (1975) 133 CLR 1. 
31 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 39B, 112E; note this also applies to moral rights under Copyright Act 
1968 (Cth) s 195AVB. 
32 [2005] FCA 972 (Unreported, Tamberlin J, 14 July 2005) [97]-[99]; Affd Cooper v Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 187 (Unreported, French, Branson and Kenny JJ, 18 December 
2006). 
33 [2005] FCA 1242 (Unreported, Wilcox J, 5 September 2005) [405]. 
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for authorisation.34 Notably, Wilcox J held that the legislative intention of s 112E was 
to ‘protect the messenger’, ie CSPs and Internet service providers.35  
 
In this regard, the critical question for user generated intermediaries under Australian 
copyright law will be firstly, whether they will be held liable for authorising copyright 
infringement for the infringing acts of their users and secondly, whether they will be 
entitled to the defence to authorisation of copyright infringement. Although, most user 
generated intermediaries do not in anyway encourage copyright infringement. 
Applying the reasoning of Wilcox J it would seem that some user generated 
intermediaries, for example YouTube are more than a mere ‘messenger’; as they are 
essentially providing a content service to the public, which extends beyond traditional 
services offered by CSPs or Internet service providers. Furthermore, the level of 
involvement by some user generated intermediaries, which for example transcode 
uploaded content into different formats or offer users additional services, may mean 
that they will found liable for authorising copyright infringement and the defence 
under s 112E denied.36 
  
B Safe harbour provisions 
As a result of the US Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act 2004 (Cth), a 
number of changes have been made to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) concerning the 
liability of CSPs for the infringement of copyright.37 These new provisions are an 
attempt to bring Australian copyright law in line with the ‘safe harbor’ provisions in 
the United States under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998. Notably, these 
provisions do not provide a complete defence for CSPs for copyright infringement; 
instead they act to mitigate liability by limiting the remedies available against CSPs 
for copyright infringement in certain circumstances.  
 
There are four categories of online activities outlined in ss 116AC to 116AF which 
will qualify for a limitation of remedies for the authorisation of copyright 
infringement under the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Generally, most user generated 
intermediaries will fall within the ‘Category C Activity’ under s 116AE, which refers 
to the storing of copyright material at the discretion of the user on a system or 
network operated by or for the CSP. Under this category in order for a CSP to qualify 
for the limitation of remedies they must comply with each of the conditions outlined 
in s 116AH of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), including adopting and implementing a 
policy to terminate the accounts of repeat infringers, complying with relevant industry 
codes, not receiving a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity 
where they have the right and ability to control the activity and expeditiously 
removing or disabling access to infringing material they are hosting when they 
become aware of it, or facts that make it apparent that the material is infringing.  
 
The key question to be determined in considering whether user generated 
intermediaries will be entitled to the limitation of remedies under the ‘safe harbour’ 
                                                 
34 [2005] FCA 1242 (Wilcox J, 5 September 2005) [401]. 
35 Universal Music Pty Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings [2005] FCA 1242 (Wilcox J, 5 September 
2005) [398], [418]. 
36 Other indicative factors include exercising discretion in removing infringing content and obtaining a 
financial benefit from infringing content. See Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 36(1A), 101(1A); Universal 
Music Pty Ltd v Sharman Licence Holdings [2005] FCA 1242 (Wilcox J, 5 September 2005) [404]. 
37 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) s 116AA. 
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provisions, will be whether they fall within the definition of a CSP. Under s 87 of the 
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), a CSP is defined narrowly as a person supplying 
a carriage service to the public using a network. It would seem unlikely that user 
generated intermediaries would fall within this definition, as they do not per se supply 
a carriage service to the public, unlike Internet service providers or CSPs. User 
generated intermediaries do not provide Internet access or any other carriage services, 
they simply provide the facility to host user generated content. Therefore, user 
generated intermediaries are unlikely to be classified as a CSP and thus will not be 
entitled to the benefit of the ‘safe harbour’ provisions under the Copyright Act 1968 
(Cth).  
 
It should be noted that under the equivalent ‘safe harbor’ provision under § 512(c) of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998 (US)38 in the United States, that user 
generated intermediaries will be entitled to the protection of the ‘safe harbor’ 
provisions, providing they comply with the necessary pre-conditions.39 This provision 
in the United States has broader operation, due to the fact that it applies to not only 
service providers, but also online service providers. An online service provider is 
defined broadly under § 512(k)(1)(b) as a provider of online services or network 
access, or the operator of facilities therefor. This broad definition will therefore 
include virtually every online service.40 The courts have also endorsed the expansive 
nature of the definition of an online service provider, holding that peer to peer file 
sharing services, Amazon and eBay all fall within the definition of an online service 
provider.41 Indeed, in Re Aimster Copyright Litigation,42 the United States District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that the term online service provider ‘is 
defined so broadly that we have trouble imagining the existence of an online service 
that would not fall under the definitions…’. 
 
 
V CONCLUSION  
 
Copyright law by its very nature fundamentally challenges the operation of user 
generated intermediaries, such as YouTube. The rapid development of Web 2.0 and 
other digital technologies have enabled consumers to easily reproduce and 
communicate digital content online, without the permission of the copyright owner. 
These challenges are highlighted in the Viacom v YouTube and Google case, which 
has the potential to redefine copyright law in the digital era. The case will also be a 
vital test case for other user generated intermediaries, such as blogs and wikis which 
face similar copyright challenges. While, it is impossible to predict how the court will 
decide in the Viacom v YouTube and Google case, assuming it does not settle, there 
are certainly strong arguments in favour of Viacom.  
 
                                                 
38 17 USC. 
39 Malik, above n 58, 439, 486-492, 503-508. 
40 Fred von Lohmann, ‘DMCA “Safe Harbors” for Online Service Providers’ (2006) 237 InfoSys 1, 3. 
41  Corbis v Amazon.com, 351 F Supp 2d 1090 (WD Wash 2004); Hendrickson v Amazon.com, 298 F 
Supp 2d 914, 915 (CD Cal 2003); Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 252 F Supp 2d 634 (ND Ill 2002); 
Re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F 3d 643, 655 (7th Cir 2003); Hendrickson v eBay Inc, 165 F 
Supp 2d 1082, 1087 (CD Cal 2001).  
42 252 F Supp 2d 634, 658 (ND Ill 2002). 
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In this regard, the safe harbor provisions in the United States and similar jurisdictions, 
were designed to strike a balance between competing interests. Service providers are 
given a degree of certainty, in that they need not actively monitor their services for 
copyrighted material, whilst copyright owners receive the benefit of expedited 
procedures to remove infringing content. The safe harbors were not designed to 
protect service providers who fail to satisfy the necessary preconditions.  Indeed, any 
service provider’s business model, which places such a high degree of reliance upon 
the judicial interpretation of a legislative provision, is fraught with legal danger.  
Other intermediaries have developed successful business models which minimise the 
risk of copyright infringement and fall safely within the safe harbors. There is no 
reason why YouTube should not do the same.  
 
  
 
 
